

30

Teaching Ethically as a Moral Condition of Professionalism

Elizabeth Campbell
OISE/University of Toronto

From Alan Tom's initial identification of teaching as a moral craft (1984) to David Hansen's exploration of the moral heart of teaching (2001), from Goodlad *et al.*'s recognition of the moral dimensions of teaching (1990), to empirical studies that vividly reveal these dimensions (Jackson *et al.* 1993; Richardson and Fenstermacher 2001), the academic and professional literature has increasingly illustrated how the moral aspects and complexities of K-12 teaching can be neither separated from its technical elements nor, worse, ignored as somehow extraneous to the central mission of education. Some connect these moral nuances, embedded in the daily life of classrooms and schools, to the professional role of the teacher and the ethical implications for professionalism more generally in teaching (Bergem 1993; Campbell 2003; Carr 2000; Oser and Althof 1993; Sockett 1993; Strike and Soltis 1992; Strike and Ternasky 1993). Within a context that integrates consideration of the moral nature of teaching with applied professional ethics in teaching, this chapter explores the concept of teacher professionalism as being inseparable from what I define as the teacher's ethical knowledge. This knowledge relates to both how teachers conduct themselves in morally appropriate ways and how they engage in moral education.

Specifically, the chapter addresses two interrelated areas, presented within discrete sections. The first argues that ethical knowledge can provide the basis of a renewed professionalism in teaching. It defines ethical knowledge and discusses teaching as unique among the professions, not least because of its moral and ethical layers. It further distinguishes ethical knowledge from formalized codes and standards. The second section, which constitutes the dominant part of this chapter, explores ethical practice as a professional imperative. It offers examples of moral agency, which underlies ethical knowledge, as illustrated by the teacher's actions as both a moral practitioner and a moral educator. Conversely, and contentiously, it further presents an argument against the co-opting of moral agency as a kind of politicized and ideological activism.

The overall theoretical framework underpinning this chapter is informed by three key assumptions or orientations to the concept of ethical knowledge that are woven throughout the discussion. First, I use the adjectives "moral" and "ethical" as more or less synonymous or interchangeable terms, a practice that seems to be increasingly defensible in an applied philosophical sense (Beckner 2004). In either case, the conceptual basis of the terms is the same in that both relate to human virtues in an Aristotelian tradition, grounded in a rejection of moral or ethical

relativism. As I have written elsewhere:

Increasingly critical of the rampant relativism embraced since the late 1960s...many philosophers and researchers interested in the moral dimensions of education assume, as part of varying ideological and conceptual frameworks, that at least a basic distinction between ethical right and wrong does not need a detailed defence. In other words, in insisting that a good teacher is neither cruel nor unfair, we need not haggle over why this is essentially a moral imperative, rather than merely a culturally and socially constructed norm reflecting the interests of some over others. (Campbell 2003, p.15)

This position echoes Clark's argument that, "In the moral domain, however, one opinion is *not* (author's emphasis) as good as any other.... Overarching principles have been agreed on in our society and within the teaching profession—principles dealing with honesty, fairness, protection of the weak, and respect for all people" (Clark 1990, p. 252). It further borrows Fenstermacher's defense when he identifies virtues such as fairness, honesty, courage, and compassion as exemplary; he states, "I leave open here the very important issue of why these particular traits are to be regarded as virtues, doing so with the philosophically lame but empirically compelling claim that the literature, customs and norms of the vast majority of world cultures hold these traits in high regard" (Fenstermacher 2001, pp. 640–641).

This non-relativist support for core virtues and the moral and ethical principles of professional conduct that build on them conforms to others' identification of a range of professional virtues such as fairness, justice, care, integrity, honesty, patience, constancy, responsibility, and various interpretations of the ancient principles of non-maleficence and beneficence (Haynes 1998; Lovat 1998; Reitz 1998; Sockett 1993; Soltis 1986; Starratt 1994; Strike & Ternasky 1993). It is further reinforced by Nucci's (2001) clear distinction between the moral domain, with its universal set of values and a "basic core of morality" (p. 19), and the social domain that is more focused on conventions and variable preferences.

As a final note in relation to this first theoretical assumption, I acknowledge that I use both the language of virtues, in the spirit of Carr (2000) and Fenstermacher (1990, 2001), and the language of moral and ethical principles, in the tradition of Strike (1990, 1995, 1999) and his work with Soltis (1992) and Ternasky (1993). This may seem philosophically confused. However, this chapter is concerned with the applied ethics embedded in the real life practices of teachers, regardless of whether these are guided by virtuous habituation or adherence to overarching principles, rather than with moral and ethical theory. I also take comfort from Colnerud's argument in relation to teacher ethics as a research problem that, "a synthesis of ethics of virtue and ethics of principles might in this case be seen as a way to create a dialogue between the two viewpoints as complementary instead of conflicting positions" (Colnerud 2006, p.372).

The second key theoretical orientation informing this chapter concentrates on the intentions and behaviors of teachers, as expressive of their ethical knowledge, rather than on the impact their style and conduct have on students' moral growth and development. As an issue of teacher professionalism, the focus on ethical knowledge revolves around what teachers do or fail to do and why rather than on what students learn from their experience. Obviously, the latter is not inconsequential, and the separation between what teachers do and say and what students take from their actions in terms of moral messages is not so neat. Nonetheless, for the purposes here, the gauge of one's ethical knowledge as a professional imperative prioritizes transmitted virtue in action and intention, not the received impact. This may be just as well given that "the relationship between a teacher's moral character and a student's moral development is far more ambiguous and troubled than much of the extant literature assumes" (Osguthorpe 2006, p.2). As Hansen clarified in his investigation of the moral impact on students that teachers have, by virtue of their

style and character, it is doubtful “whether a teacher’s moral influence can ever be verified. Such influence may not be a matter of cause and effect in any direct manner, and so may not be measurable in the familiar meaning of that term” (Hansen 1993a, p. 418). Ultimately, this chapter is considerably less concerned with the philosophical question, “Can virtue be taught?” than with the professional question, “How can teachers conduct their work in schools virtuously?” One may note that this chapter’s title is “Teaching Ethically,” and not “Teaching Ethics.”

The third and last orientation is based on the premise that ethical knowledge is the domain of responsible and professionally accountable individual teachers, working both independently and collectively, rather than the expression of organizational structures, institutional influences, systemic realities, and other forces beyond the control of the individual practitioner. This is not to deny the obvious point that teachers work within systems and administrative structures, and that contextual elements have an evident influence on their daily working lives. Nonetheless, such realities should not obscure the moral responsibility of individuals for their own professional conduct and replace it with a kind of organizational culpability so sharply criticized by Sommers (1984) as the ideology that shifted the traditional “seat of moral responsibility” (p. 387) from being a matter of an individual’s personal virtue to society and its various institutions.

When people reminisce about their school days, in both positive and negative respects, they invariably recall, in terms that say much about human character, individual teachers who touched their lives, for better or worse, rather than referencing overall school policies, norms, and systemic forces. In one study, in which students were asked about the strengths and weaknesses of their schools, they uniformly based their answers on their teachers (Weissbourd 2003). Hansen (2001) reminds us that, “character has to do with how the person (of the teacher) regards and treats others” (p. 29). Similarly, others have concluded that the character of the individual teacher is central to the moral nature of education (Luckowski 1997; Sockett 1996; Wynne and Ryan 1997). Ethical knowledge is rooted in the individual teacher’s moral sensibility and character, and augmented through experience by communities of professionals sharing and refining this virtue based knowledge as it is reflected daily in schools.

ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE AS THE FOUNDATION OF TEACHER PROFESSIONALISM

The teacher’s moral agency is an inevitable state of being that is revealed whenever the teacher, as a moral person, conducts him or herself in schools with honesty, a sense of fairness, integrity, compassion, patience, respect, impartiality, care, dedication, and other such core virtues. It is also demonstrated when the teacher, as a moral educator, invokes students to appreciate such similar virtues and to conduct themselves in ways that honor them. Teachers may reflect this dual concept of moral agency formally or informally, consciously and intentionally or not, and frequently or rarely.

By extension, ethical knowledge is quite simply the heightened awareness that teachers—some more than others—have of their moral agent state of being. It is the focused and self-conscious recognition of how moral agency influences their daily actions and interactions, and it compels their deliberate attentiveness to ensure that these influences are experienced positively in a moral and ethical sense. As Buzzelli and Johnston (2002) explain in their description of the teacher as a moral agent, “In this view, teaching is an activity involving a deep awareness of the significance of one’s choices and how those choices influence the development and well-being of others. An awareness of the moral significance of one’s work enlarges the understanding of that work” (p. 120). This level of awareness is cultivated when teachers develop the capacity

to identify how moral and ethical values and principles are either exemplified or undermined by their own actions, words, choices, and intentions. Such connections are made intellectually, emotionally, intuitively, philosophically, practically, and experientially as teachers engage in individual reflection and collective discussion with peers about the work they do daily. The concept of ethical knowledge assumes, as many sources from the scholarly literature confirm, that teaching is a moral profession with inherently ethical dimensions embedded in its practice and intent (Buzzelli and Johnston 2002; Campbell 2003; Colnerud 1997; Fenstermacher 2001; Goodlad *et al.* 1990; Goodman and Lesnick 2004; Hansen 2001; Haynes 1998; Hostetler 1997; Huebner 1996; Jackson *et al.* 1993; Richardson and Fenstermacher 2001; Sanger 2001; Sockett 1993; Starratt 1994; Stengel and Tom 1995; Strike 1995; Tirri and Husu 2002).

Ethical knowledge, albeit incomplete and ever evolving, based on the dynamics of new and unpredictable experiences, “illustrates teachers’ devotion to living through their actions essential moral and ethical principles descriptive of a human legacy in all its complexities and apparent contradictions” (Campbell 2003, p. 138). Thus, on one hand, ethical knowledge is honed within school climates rife with dilemmas and tensions as teachers, like anyone else, interpret and prioritize core moral values and principles in divergent ways. They make decisions based on what Strike (1999) would characterize as “moral pluralism” in ways that are both conflicting and compatible along a wide spectrum of moral goods. And, as Sirotnik (1990) reminds us, in his defense of moral imperatives, “An anti-relativist position, however, does not automatically resolve fundamental questions, dilemmas, and issues” (p. 320).

On the other hand, ethical knowledge, while rooted in an individual’s sensibility and experience, is also, I would argue, an expression of applied professional ethics in teaching (Carr 2000; Lovat 1998; Nash 1996; Schwartz 1998; Sockett and LePage 2002; Strike and Ternasky 1993), and should ultimately embody a sense of collective professionalism, not individual subjectivity. This is what underpins the concept of “knowledge.” One may recall Goodson’s (2003) discussion of teachers’ professional knowledge and the importance of “principled professionalism” that “will develop from clearly agreed moral and ethical principles” (p. 132). And, as I have stated before, the extensive knowledge of some teachers, who are quite aware of and attentive to the moral and ethical elements of their practice, is “usable, sharable, and learnable” (Campbell 2003, p. 139) in ways that may enable more teachers, who may be less aware, to develop it. As a body of knowledge, then, it can form the foundation of renewed professionalism in teaching in a sense that is unique among the professions (Campbell 2004).

For those who study professional ethics in teaching as well as other disciplines, be it from an applied philosophical perspective (Nash 1996; Strike and Ternasky 1993) or a psychology based orientation (Rest and Narváez 1994), some level of agreement on relevant ethical positions is a given, whether they are grounded in general core virtues or on related principles associated with the specifics of the profession, or, most likely, on both (Coombs 1998; MacMillan 1993; Thompson 1997). However, unlike in medicine or law, where the ethical principles are applied to the practice of the dominant professional knowledge base (medical sciences or legal precepts and precedents, for example), in teaching the professional knowledge base is the ethical knowledge base. It is far more challenging to disentangle the ethics of teaching from the very process, practice, and intent of teaching as “the teacher’s conduct, at all times and in all ways, is a moral matter” (Fenstermacher 1990, p. 133). As Carr (1993) claims, “The knowledge and understanding which should properly inform the professional consciousness of the competent teacher is...a kind of moral wisdom or judgement which is rooted in rational reflection about educational policies and practices and what is *ethically* (author’s emphasis), as well as instrumentally, appropriate to achieve them” (p. 265).

This ethical judgment (Hostetler 1997) is called on every time a teacher strives to balance

the fair treatment of an individual student with the fair treatment of the class group, or when the teacher chooses curricular materials and pedagogical strategies with care and sensitivity, or when evaluation is conducted with scrupulous honesty accompanied by a concern for the emotional well being of students, or when kindness tempers discipline. While mastery of subject matter, proficiency in classroom management techniques, skilled understanding of pedagogy, and a comprehensive grasp of evaluation and assessment strategies are integral elements of the competent teacher's repertoire, it is the practical moral wisdom—the ethical knowledge—that is infused into every aspect of such technical abilities and the humanity teachers bring to their practice that distinguish them as professionals.

Furthermore, education as an ethical profession and a “thoroughly moral business” (Socokett 1996 p. 124), is unique by virtue of the exceptional vulnerability and dependence of the primary “clients”—other people's children—in addition to their non-voluntary presence in schools (Bull 1993; Colnerud 2001, 2006; Dickinson 2001; Soder 1990). As well as having a significant fiduciary duty represented by the public trust in them, teachers are also considered moral exemplars and educators, implicitly and explicitly, and therefore must be concerned with the educative enrichment in ethical terms of their pupils in ways that other professionals need not be.

Ironically, despite its distinctive moral nature as a profession, many have observed that education lacks an “ethical language” (Strike 1995, p. 33) or a “moral language” that could help teachers recognize, articulate and communicate with other teachers about the moral and ethical complexities of their work (Colnerud 2006; Huebner 1996; Socokett and LePage 2002). Despite supporting the belief that most teachers generally try to be seriously committed to the well-being of students and act with intuitively good judgment, Socokett and LePage (2002) address the lamentable current state in the profession due to this lack of a moral vocabulary. They propose in its absence that teachers need a kind of “moral case law” (p. 170) to provide a base for making confident ethical judgments that transcend mere intuition.

Ethical knowledge has its origins in moral sensibility and intuitive perspectives on right and wrong; however, as it intersects with a deliberative awareness of one's own practice, as well as that of others, it moves into the realm of practical moral wisdom, a kind of professional virtue-in-action that could resemble “moral case law.” To be clear, this is quite distinct from formalized ethical codes and standards that idealize principles and virtues, rather than illuminate how they pertain to daily professional life, or focus so narrowly on legal and contractual issues that any moral emphasis is obscured. Traditionally, such adjectives as “inadequate, bureaucratic, and legalistic” (Watras 1986, p. 13) and “platitudinous and perfunctory” (Strike and Ternasky 1993, p. 2) have been leveled at ethical codes. While they may provide worthwhile inspiration to teachers by their very existence (Beckner 2004; Bradley 1998; Campbell 2000; Freeman 1998), they have not been regarded as an effective vehicle to enhance ethical practice or deepen the profession's appreciation of the moral nuances of the role (Campbell 2001; Sergiovanni 1992; Soltis 1986; Strom 1989). Ethical knowledge, not ethical codes, best captures the essence of professionalism in teaching as it enables teachers to appreciate the complexities of their moral agency.

ETHICAL PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL IMPERATIVE

We [teachers] have a lot of moral obligations to our students and we are very serious about them. I don't come here [school] to collect a pay cheque and go home. Everybody works because we all need to get paid. But, there is some sense of satisfaction in what you do when I can walk out of here feeling good about what I do. Sometimes, however, I feel terrible because I worry that I wasn't fair to somebody during the day or that I didn't get back to somebody who needed to talk

to me. I'm always scared of giving messages to students that might be taken the wrong way. So, you find that your day is all over the place and you think, what did I do today? What did I get accomplished because it just seemed like such a hectic day? I'm not a superhuman being, but I too have to make sure I make good choices. (elementary school teacher in Campbell 2003, p. 46)

The previous section introduced the notion of moral agency in teaching as the defining characteristic of the role of the teacher. It is the teacher's astute awareness of the nuances and moral complexities of this role and how they are embedded in practice that measures his or her ethical knowledge. It further proposed that this ethical knowledge, as a kind of applied professional ethics, has the potential to provide the knowledge base in teaching to define its professionalism. This section focuses on practices in teaching that exemplify moral agency, firstly, by depicting them as being rooted in virtues and principles and, secondly, by presenting an argument against what I judge to be the co-opting of moral agency on the basis of politics, not principles.

Reflecting Moral Agency as Daily Action

Integral to the moral and ethical nature of teaching and schooling is the role of the teacher as a moral agent and moral exemplar (Fenstermacher 2001; Hansen 1993b, 2001; Katz *et al.* 1999; Reitz 1998;Sizer and Sizer 1999). Closely associated with this role is the teacher's inevitable capacity to be a moral educator (Berkowitz 2000; Borba 2001; Campbell 1997; Goodman and Lesnick 2004; Halstead and Taylor 2000; Lickona 1991 and 2004; McCadden 1998; Nash 1997; Noddings 2002; Nucci 2001; Ryan and Bohlin 1999; Wynne and Ryan 1997). Moral agency is a dual state that encompasses the teacher as a moral person engaged in ethical professional conduct and as a moral educator who teaches to students the same core virtues and principles that he or she strives to uphold in practice (Campbell 2003). The connection between these two aspects of moral agency is evident as teachers live out through their actions, attitudes, and words the same virtues they hope to instill in their students. As one secondary school teacher explained, "If I don't want kids to yell at me, then I have to make sure I don't yell at them. It's as simple as that. If I want them to care about each other, then I have to show care towards them; so, sometimes I do things for them. As a simple example, if a kid drops her pen, I'll get it for her. I don't say, 'Well, you dropped your pen, get it yourself'" (Campbell 2003, p. 37). It is the first characteristic of moral agency that enables the teacher to establish an ethical tone in the classroom that, by extension, models virtuous conduct and cultivates educative environments conducive to the purposes of the second characteristic, moral education (Goodman and Lesnick 2004; Ravitch and Viteritti 2001; Simon 2001; Watson 2003).

Hansen (1993b) wisely noted, "not everything that teachers do *necessarily* (author's emphasis) has moral significance, but any action a teacher takes *can* (author's emphasis) have moral import" (p. 669). In the terms of moral agency and ethical knowledge, what makes teachers' practices morally and ethically meaningful rests on whether core virtues and principles are evidently bound up in their intentions and actions. The ways in which these may be illustrated are as numerous as the teachers, students, and daily interactions in schools themselves. Perhaps they are reflected when a teacher exercises care in selecting and displaying student work, equitably allocating time, attention, privileges, and duties to students, organizing small work groups to ensure fairness to all, enforcing school and classroom rules with consistency, or when the teacher uses caution and wisdom in the choice of sensitive curricular resources or assesses student performance with honesty, fairness, and kindness. One can also hear ethical knowledge in the tone of a teacher's voice, the terms of politeness, respect, and warmth that are used, the distinction between sarcasm and humor, the refusal to embarrass or humiliate individual students in front

of others, and the recognition that negative staffroom gossip about students and their families is not professional conduct. Ethical knowledge is also reflected each time a teacher consciously reminds, admonishes, corrects, and instructs students on how their behavior affects others. The teacher's effort to cultivate a civil and caring climate in the classroom represents more than an organizing strategy for an efficient community of learners—it represents a sense of moral agency and moral purpose.

Since the early 1990s, we have been introduced to a variety of teachers through significant classroom based empirical studies whose daily practices, conscious or not, reflect the moral dimensions of teaching (Campbell 2003; Hansen 1993a, 2002; Jackson *et al.* 1993; McCadden 1998; Richardson and Fenstermacher 2000; Richardson and Fallona 2001; Sanger 2001; Simon 2001; Sockett 1993). Invariably, these teachers are shown to be fair, caring, honest, respectful, and empathetic, among other virtues. Their actions support a well-reasoned argument that the two ethics of justice and care should temper each other and not act as opposite extremes (Katz *et al.* 1999; Obidah *et al.* 2004; Walker and Snarey 2004). Fairness or justice, as “the first professional principle” (Bricker 1989, p. 28) is revealed to be far more complex than one might imagine, as interpretations of what is just and fair differ in varying contexts between equal or differential treatment of students (Colnerud 1997; Fallona 2000; Nucci 2001). These and other virtues are both exemplified and challenged in seemingly mundane decisions the teacher makes from calling on students to take turns answering questions during class and when to allow extensions on assignments to more serious dilemmas involving students who cheat, colleagues whose conduct is potentially harmful to students (Campbell 1996; Colnerud 1997; Tirri and Husu 2002), or involving suspicions of child abuse.

Not surprisingly, teachers cannot be ever cognizant of the moral and ethical implications of everything they do in the course of a day. Teaching is enormously demanding, frequently frustrating, occasionally overwhelming, and always an eclectic mix of planned formality and spontaneous serendipity. And, as Buzzelli and Johnston (2002) point out, teachers do have “blind spots in (their) ability to perceive the moral in situations” (p. 125). Nevertheless, their actions transmit moral messages, and the students are watching, to borrow a phrase fromSizer andSizer (1999). Consequently, the teacher's role as a moral exemplar and educator extends from this.

As stated at the beginning of the chapter, this discussion of moral agency and ethical knowledge centers on the conduct of the professional teacher rather than on assessing the moral growth of students. So, as moral exemplars and educators, what are teachers' intentions, aspirations, and actions? For one elementary teacher, her responsibilities as a moral educator were defined not only by the immediate need to foster a positive relational climate in her classroom, but also by a larger societal expectation. She explained:

I see quite a bit of meanness among students, and I'm not going to tolerate it because we're two months into the school year now, and I think they should know right from wrong in a basic sense. Of course, you're going to get more complicated issues where naturally I'll help them through it, but they should know by now that if somebody drops something, you don't kick it. Also, when you keep disrupting you are disrespecting. You are telling the children around you that it doesn't matter to me that I'm stopping the whole class for attention or I'm stopping the whole class from their learning. What matters is that I want attention and I want it now. And, that's an ethical issue because students have to come to some understanding, maybe not at the moment, but eventually, that you can't function in a society like ours if you're constantly speaking out and you're not listening to others. (Elementary school teacher in Campbell 2003, p. 48)

This is reminiscent of Grant's (1996) claim, in her discussion of hand-raising and taking turns in class conversations, that “teachers are quite self-consciously teaching both verbal skills

and social skills during this time. But these social skills require certain moral capacities and qualities of character” (p. 471). In the language of this chapter, teachers’ “self-consciousness” of their moral instruction is indicative of their ethical knowledge. Similarly, one secondary school teacher explained her continuous efforts in the classroom to cultivate a sense of empathy for others, patience, tolerance, self-discipline, courage, personal responsibility, mutual respect, and honesty this way: “I’m planting the seeds, and the seeds will at some point in time in their lives, they’ll blossom. Maybe not right now; maybe one student out of the 28 may get it now. Who knows, but I’m optimistic, and if I can reinforce in them the right behaviour, at some point in their lives, they’ll get it. They’ll understand” (Campbell 2003, p. 56).

Like many other teachers, these two were observed reinforcing good behavior by using combinations of the methods to foster moral conduct identified in Richardson and Fenstermacher’s “Manner in Teaching Project”: constructing classroom communities, didactic instruction, design and execution of academic tasks, calling out for particular conduct, private conversations, and showcasing specific students (Fenstermacher 2001). Similarly, Jackson *et al.* (1993) empirically identified several categories of instruction in which moral education occurs both formally and informally, including official curricula, rituals and ceremonies, visual displays of moral content, spontaneous interjections or moral commentary, and rules and regulations. In a similar vein, Berkowitz (2000) includes in his list of “generic moral education” initiatives the promotion of a moral atmosphere, role modeling of good character, discussions of moral issues in class, and curriculum lessons in character. One of the most currently popular and referenced variants of moral education, which will be addressed further in the subsequent section, is “character education” (Lickona 1991, 2004; Murphy 1998; Ryan 1993; Ryan and Bohlin 1999). Described as “the methodical and deliberate inculcation of moral virtues through a variety of planned lessons and exercises that usually involve a school-wide initiative” (Campbell 2004, p. 35), character education is dependent entirely on the role of the teacher as a moral agent and exemplar.

Moral agency, as it is discussed in this chapter, is an inevitable result of the teacher’s role and professional responsibilities. It is expressed and revealed in the daily practice of teachers who model, self-regulate, instruct, relate, admonish, and engage. It is the illumination of virtues and moral and ethical principles as they are woven through the intricacies of school and classroom life.

Politicizing Moral Agency as Ideological Activism

This chapter has framed the discussion of moral agency in terms of the core virtues and ethical principles teachers personally exude or apply to their practice and, similarly, those they teach to students. It is reflective of a legacy of moral education that is historically, philosophically, and professionally defensible. By contrast, there is a significant conceptual distinction between this interpretation of moral agency as a natural extension of what ethical teachers do on a daily basis and some more contemporary trends towards the promotion of political and ideological agenda disguised as moral education and justified by teachers who corrupt their professional role as moral agents to inculcate such agenda in the classroom. Admittedly, this part of the chapter will be the most argumentative and, to some, contentious. However, it is also central to its conceptual foundation of which an underlying assumption is that moral agency, as well as the ethical knowledge teachers cultivate as a result of their awareness of their agency, is about generalized moral and ethical values relating to how human beings should treat one another (e.g., kindly, fairly, truthfully). This is quite distinct from partisan causes deemed to be moral by some because of a political based, rather than a virtue based, conviction or affiliation. By extension, the purpose of moral education is to develop ethical individuals who appreciate the demands of living in a free

civil society, who develop empathy for others and a commitment to personal responsibility for one's individual actions. This is in stark contrast to the cultivation of students as moralistic social activists bent on enforcing their political will on others regarding controversial social issues that have not been fully debated, decided, or ultimately accepted within society.

There are many different approaches to teaching that satisfy the mandates of professionalism by honoring the moral agency role of teachers. There are others that, according to the argument explored here, have the potential to "cross the line" beyond professional virtue into the murky domain of indoctrination. This discussion addresses three broad conceptualizations of moral education: character education (Lickona 1991, 2004; Murphy 1998; Ryan and Bohlin 1999; Wynne and Ryan 1997) and its critics (Kohn 1997; Nash 1997), caring as moral education (Noddings 2002), and social justice/critical democratic orientations (Beyer 1991, 1997). The comparison will not be exhaustive; however, it will focus on the teacher as a moral agent and exemplar. It concludes that while the first two approaches have the potential to lead to the politicization of the classroom, they need not necessarily do so. On the other hand, the third approach, by its own definition and intention most deliberately politicizes moral agency.

Character education, as the formalized and direct method of instruction in virtues and principles of moral conduct (Lickona 2004; Wiley 1998), has been both championed and criticized more than any other approach to moral education in recent years. Grounded in a repudiation of moral relativism and in a philosophical and historical legacy of support for core virtues and universal moral values, its conceptual basis shares much with this chapter's orientation to ethical knowledge. For many, character education is a natural extension of what teachers, as moral agents, do as part of the inevitable function of their role—helping to socialize children to become virtuous individuals capable of living in a society where principles such as honesty, fairness, kindness, respect, tolerance, integrity, and responsibility are widely valued and reflected in the social norms and legal foundations of the society. Studies have concluded that, in this respect, teachers do not necessarily see character education as controversial or politically motivated, but rather view it as a very significant aspect of their professional responsibilities (Jones *et al.* 1998; Leming and Yendol-Hoppey 2004; Mathison 1998). As these studies note, teachers may differ on their interpretation of what character education means as a pedagogical approach, but they generally do not question the underlying importance of reinforcing good moral values that transcend normative social or cultural differences among us and instead nurture a positive sense of our collective humanity. As one study noted, the "days of value neutrality are over" (Jones *et al.*, 1998, p. 14).

While generally supportive of the theoretical essence of character education, some thoughtfully question its methods as a formal program. As Damon (2001) argues, "the moral atmosphere that students actually experience in their schools—the manner of their teachers, the integrity of the school codes, the quality of the peer relationships that they form—has more influence on character growth than do academic programs" (p. 132). Some critics focus on aspects of those programs that emphasize extrinsic rewards for good behavior, drill, and unreflective or simplistic acceptance of moral precepts or use what are seen to be gimmicky and contrived strategies to inculcate virtues. They see these elements as indefensible not only in a moral sense but also in a pedagogical one. However, even among such critics, there are those who would not dispute the importance of good moral values (Berkowitz 1998; Nash 1997; Noddings 2002). In this respect, Sockett (1996) has referred to himself as a "sympathetic critic" (p. 124), as has Noddings (2002). Similarly, even in their pointed criticism of character education, Joseph and Efron (2005) refer to its advocates' "good intentions" (p. 532).

Other critics are not at all sympathetic and vilify character education in political terms as a "right wing" attempt to indoctrinate children (Beyer 1991, 1997; Kohn 1996, 1997). Such critics,

often but not exclusively writing from more radical perspectives of the ideological “left,” question not simply the methods of character education but mostly the conceptual justification for the support of core virtues as well as the inherent implication that moral responsibility as well as negligence rest largely within the domain of individuals’ actions and attitudes rather than in societal structures, systems, and economies. Fundamental differences in perspectives along broad political and ideological lines between these critics and those who support various philosophies of character education have been well documented by, among others, Nash (1997), McClellan (1999), and Smagorinsky and Taxel (2005).

In contrast to such critics, the conceptual basis of this chapter’s discussion of moral agency and ethical knowledge in teaching is consistent with the virtues and principles advanced by the character educators, even though it agrees with previously mentioned criticism of some of their instructional methods. Not surprisingly, this line of argument views accusations against character education as political indoctrination to be overstated and arguable. Of course, character educators can politicize the public school classroom just as any other teacher can; and, if modeling and instruction in the virtues lapse instead into one-sided sermons about specific political, cultural, or religious beliefs and causes—from pro-life stances to creationism—then the line separating moral agency and ideological activism has been crossed. However, such political motivations do not define character education. A respect for good moral values that have wide support in the mainstream population and are the bedrock of the norms and laws of civil society is what defines it as a kind of moral education inseparable from the teacher’s role as moral agent, model, exemplar, and educator.

As mentioned, there are those who share the character educators’ non-relativist support for moral values, such as honesty and care, yet believe that they should be explored in a more nuanced sense and “problematized” in the classroom in ways that acknowledge differing and often conflicting contexts and controversies (Noddings 2002; Simon 2001; Sockett 1996). They refer to the cultivation of “caring communities” (Joseph and Efron 2005) as an alternative approach to moral education that, while contextualizing moral values more than character education does, still similarly emphasizes mutually supportive relationships, respectful and safe discourse, and fair and inclusive interactions. This relational approach is grounded in responsiveness, receptivity, and relatedness, rather than in moral reasoning (Valli 1990, cited in Hansen 1998). However, as with character education, the priority is on reinforcing morally positive values that enable empathy and responsibility to flourish within school and classroom based communities, and the role of the teacher as a moral agent is central. While politicization of this approach by means of “sermonizing” (Simon 2001, p. 206) is certainly possible, as it is in character education, it need not be its primary intention.

In contrast, the third broad approach to a more obviously politicized version of moral education changes the teacher’s professional role from moral agent to social activist. Advocates of this approach are among the harshest critics of character education, and their orientation to moral education is not that its purpose is to cultivate among individuals a dedication to core virtues and moral principles, but rather to engage students in the critical examination of such principles and more importantly of society’s authority structures, systems, norms, and practices. Critics of this approach assert that it “fails as an ethical enterprise” (Grant 1996, p. 472) for its potential to foster moral relativism, dogmatism, and partisanship in the classroom. Its focus is on “ideology and doctrine rather than on personal responsibility and practical decency” (Sommers 1984, p. 388).

Ideologically reflective of the political left, this broad approach encompasses a range of curricular orientations such as those frequently aligned with issues of equity and social justice (not to be confused with neo-classical virtue theory based on equality and justice), critical theory,

anti-discriminatory pedagogy, liberationist perspectives, anti-racist and multicultural education, and critical democratic education (Adams *et al.* 2006; Apple 1996; Doll 1993; McLaren 1994, 1997; Purpel 1999; Slattery and Rapp 2003). As a term used by many in education, “social justice” has worked its way into the mainstream discourse and is often indistinguishable as a political concept from character educators’ and others’ virtue based discussions about the need for all students, regardless of differences, to be treated fairly, kindly, with respect and dignity, and so on. Nonetheless, its modern roots lie, at least dominantly, within the political realm of Marxist as well as more general socialist theory and reflect a central emphasis on societal and material inequities (Koschoreck 2006). In their defense of the ethic of critique, based on critical theory and social justice, in education, Shapiro and Stefkovich (2005) define its origins in “modified Marxian analysis,” “Freirian critical pedagogy that views classrooms as political and not only educational locations” (pp. 14–15), and they connect it closely to the call for political activism on the part of educators.

While advocates of this conceptualization tend not to use the language of virtue or moral and civic dispositions (Nash 1997), they often represent their critique as a moral or ethical stance, and such critique can take many forms in the classroom. For example, in their comprehensive presentation of “seven worlds of moral education,” Joseph and Efron (2005) identify three alternatives to character education that clearly emanate from this perspective. Firstly, they describe the “cultural heritage” world that promotes the teaching of “non-mainstream” values from “non-dominant cultures”; ironically, some of the moral values referenced such as “respect for one another,” and “empathy” are not unlike the virtues hailed by the character educators.

Secondly, the article introduces “peace education” that extends the idea of a caring community beyond the classroom, politicizes it along the lines of partisan causes representing varying interests from environmental education, global education, human rights and animal rights activism, to peace studies and conflict resolution. Even the authors, who are not opposed to this alternative, note that it is difficult to implement in public schools because of its “potential for conflict with community values” prevalent in mainstream society (Joseph and Efron 2005, p. 529).

Thirdly, the article identifies “social action” as a desirable form of moral education that focuses on the political nature of society as a whole, challenges examples of perceived privilege and oppression, and works towards the goal of effecting critical social change. By way of example, we are told of a grade 5 history class in Colorado studying the U.S. Civil War and slavery. In order to make “students learn to view themselves as social and political beings” (p. 530), the teachers engaged them in an activity to raise awareness of slavery in the Sudan. “The children raised money to buy freedom for a few slaves...donations came in from around the world, and the class eventually purchased the freedom of more than 1000 people” (Joseph and Efron 2005, p. 530). For those of us who view the teacher’s moral agency as rooted in the exercising and exemplifying of virtue and ethical principles rather than the crusading for political causes, such an example of “moral education” seems quite appalling. By tugging on the heartstrings of young children, this initiative essentially helps to sustain rather than disrupt the virulent slave trade by playing by its own terms (purchasing freedom) as if they are somehow morally justifiable or expedient rather than abhorrent, and probably did little more for the students than give them a self-satisfied sense of moral righteousness.

Others have addressed ideologically similar social action initiatives that reflect what Berkowitz (1998) has identified approvingly as a “much more expanded interpretation of character education than once conceptualized” (p. 2). Indeed, one may argue that such a redefinition of the term, “character education,” not simply expands its scope to include a highly diffuse range of activities, but also, more significantly, redirects its conceptual orientation into a different ideological arena. For example, Donahue (1999) advocates the use of “change-oriented service-learning”

in schools as a way for teachers to “challenge social, political, economic structures that allow injustice” (p. 687). Politically motivated and activist in intention, this orientation to service learning is quite distinct from other forms that some character educators support that tend instead to emphasize philanthropy, caring, the cultivation of empathy and other virtues in students, and social responsibility as opposed to social transformation. As Donahue notes, “a teacher’s intention behind assigning such a task shapes the way students reflect on the service, directing their learning toward one orientation or the other” (p. 688). He acknowledges the ethical dilemmas confronting teachers who differ over these two quite different orientations to a form of moral education. He favors the social transformation approach and recommends its introduction in pre-service teacher education as a way to prepare future teachers to understand the moral imperatives of their profession (p. 685).

Such a perspective is reminiscent of Valli’s (1990) “critical” approach within her framework for reflective teacher education in which the moral basis of teaching is emphasized. It also would likely resonate with Beyer (1997) who, like Donahue, promotes the political, cultural, and social contextualization of moral issues within teacher education programs as a way to enable teachers to raise critical questions about schooling and current teaching practices. He applauds the student teacher who has her pupils “critique their own texts” (p. 249) in the search for historical prejudices, and another teacher who represented to her grade 4 students a school rule about silence in the hallways as a political power struggle with an authoritarian school administration rather than a policy designed to respect other classrooms and guard against their disruption. To the teacher, and to Beyer, the rule is seen as politically based, not virtue based, and the moral lesson is to question authority, not to learn about the virtues of respect and consideration for others.

Such examples of “teaching against the grain” (Joseph 2003, p. 12) represent the moral agency of teachers as deeply connected to wider social and political causes that are invariably controversial in the public sphere (Nord 2001) and rarely evoke the language of professional *virtue* that is representative of moral agency and ethical knowledge as discussed in this chapter. Hansen (2001) notes that the “big ideals” about social betterment may motivate teachers in ways that are not necessarily bad. For example, despite his claims to political activism, Ayers (2004) refers to such big ideals not as partisan causes that extend beyond the teacher’s scope of authority but instead in the context of the individual teacher’s capacity to foster within the classroom a sense of respect for all, compassion, and “an unshakable commitment to helping human beings reach the full measure of their humanity” (p. 5). He even refers to the traditional Aristotelian virtue of friendship as a “truer model of what we should seek in teacher professionalism” (p. 85). These ideals parallel what the teacher as a moral agent strives to uphold in ways that exemplify the best of human virtue, not the agenda of social and political activists, regardless of their ideology. For, as Hansen (2001) cautions, “Ideals can become ideological or doctrinaire and can lead teachers away from their educational obligations and cause them to treat their students as a means to an end, whether the latter be political, social, or whatever” (p. 188).

Ethical teachers should be moral agents and moral models, not moralistic activists. Their professional responsibility in this moral sense is an immediate and direct one that honors the public’s trust in them and does not stray beyond the boundaries of their mandate. It is simply to hold themselves accountable for how they treat the students in their care and how they cultivate for them schooling experiences and relationships based on time-honored virtues such as fairness, honesty, integrity, civility, compassion, constancy, and responsibility, that are reflected in the best of societal values, norms, and laws and that parallel most parents’ reasonable expectations of public schooling. When teachers come to believe that the ethics of their profession relate more to how they can serve wider political agenda as social reconstructionists than to how they should monitor their daily practice and duties to their own students, their moral agency is compromised,

and the prospect for the development of a virtue based professional ethics expressive of ethical knowledge in teaching is threatened.

In conclusion, moral agency may be broadly conceived in terms of not only what teachers teach students by direct curricular means, but also more significantly what teachers do themselves as ethical professionals in classrooms and the virtues and moral principles they reflect and, hence, model to students on a daily basis. As Nash (2005) claims:

The place we call school is an environment of moral interaction and sometimes moral struggle. Children's ability to expand moral sensitivity and ethical reasoning skills will very much depend upon how adults around them model ethical behavior and ethical reasoning. Essentially, a teacher's conduct, at all times and in all ways, is a moral matter. (p. 4)

While the emphasis of this chapter has been on the teacher's conduct rather than the students' moral growth, the point to be stressed is that teachers are answerable, individually and collectively, for the choices they make in the classroom, the motivations that drive them, the actions they take, and the words they use, regardless of whether the direct effect they may or may not have on students can be empirically proven. As a matter of professionalism, the measure of ethical teaching relies on the intentions of teachers, as much as on their influence. Their awareness of such intentions and their deliberative attention to the specificities of their daily practice, as filtered through the lens of virtues and moral principles, attest to their ethical knowledge. And, ultimately, it is this ethical knowledge that is a defining characteristic of professionalism in teaching.

REFERENCES

- Adams, M., Bell, L. A., & Griffin, P. (2006). *Teaching for diversity and social justice* (2nd ed.). London and New York: Routledge.
- Apple, M. W. (1996). *Cultural politics and education*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Ayers, W. (2004). *Teaching the personal and the political: Essays on hope and justice*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Beckner, W. (2004). *Ethics for educational leaders*. Boston: Pearson.
- Bergem, T. (1993). Examining aspects of professional morality. *Journal of Moral Education*, 22(3), 297–312.
- Berkowitz, M. W. (1998). Obstacles to teacher training in character education. *Action in Teacher Education*, 20(4), 1–10.
- Berkowitz, M. W. (2000). Civics and moral education. In B. Moon, S. Brown, & M. Ben-Peretz (Eds.), *Routledge International Companion to Education* (pp. 897–909). New York: Routledge.
- Beyer, L. E. (1991). Schooling, moral commitment, and the preparation of teachers. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 42(3), 205–215.
- Beyer, L. E. (1997). The moral contours of teacher education. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 48(4), 245–254.
- Borba, M. (2001). *Building moral intelligence: The seven essential virtues that teach kids to do the right thing*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Bradley, J. G. (1998). Some random thoughts on the ethical behaviour of teacher candidates, *McGill Journal of Education*, 33(3), 299–324.
- Bricker, D. C. (1989). *Classroom life as civic education: Individual achievement and student cooperation in schools*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Bull, B. (1993). Ethics in the preservice curriculum, in K. A. Strike & P. L. Ternasky (Eds.), *Ethics for professionals in education: Perspectives for preparation and practice* (pp. 69–83). New York: Teachers College Press.

- Buzzelli, C. A., and Johnston, B. (2002). *The moral dimensions of teaching: Language, power, and culture in classroom interaction*. New York and London: Routledge Falmer.
- Campbell, E. (1996). Ethical implications of collegial loyalty as one view of teacher professionalism. *Teachers and Teaching: Theory and practice*, 2(2):191–208.
- Campbell, E. (1997). Connecting the ethics of teaching and moral education. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 48(4), 255–263.
- Campbell, E. (2000). Professional ethics in teaching: towards the development of a code of practice. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 30(2), 203–221.
- Campbell, E. (2001). Let right be done: Trying to put ethical standards into practice. *Journal of Educational Policy*, 16(5), 395–411.
- Campbell, E. (2003). *The ethical teacher*. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill.
- Campbell, E. (2004). Ethical knowledge and moral agency as the essence of applied professional ethics in teaching. *Professional Studies Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 1(1), 29–38.
- Carr, D. (1993). Questions of competence. *British Journal of Educational Studies*, 51(3), 253–271.
- Carr, D. (2000). *Professionalism and ethics in teaching*. London: Routledge.
- Clark, C. M. (1990). The teacher and the taught: moral transactions in the classroom. In J. I. Goodlad, R. Soder, & K. A. Sirotnik (Eds.), *The moral dimensions of teaching* (pp. 251–265). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Colnerud, G. (1997). Ethical conflicts in teaching. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 13(6), 627–635.
- Colnerud, G. (2001). Aristotle and teacher ethics. *Nordic Educational Research*, 21(3), 149–156.
- Colnerud, G. (2006). Teacher ethics as a research problem: Syntheses achieved and new issues. *Teachers and teaching: Theory and practice*, 12(3), 365–385.
- Coombs, J. R. (1998). Educational ethics: Are we on the right track? *Educational Theory*, 48(4), 555–569.
- Damon, W. (2001). To not fade away: Restoring civil identity among the young. In D. Ravitch & J. P. Viteritti (Eds.), *Making good citizens: Education and civil society* (pp. 122–141). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Dickinson, G. M. (2001). Teachers, trust, and the law: The matter of sexual misconduct. *Orbit*, 32(2), 15–19.
- Doll, W. E. Jr. (1993). *A post-modern perspective on curriculum*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Donahue, D. M. (1999). Service-learning for preservice teachers: Ethical dilemmas for practice. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 15, 685–695.
- Fallona, C. (2000). Manner in teaching: A study in observing and interpreting teachers' moral virtues. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 16, 681–695.
- Fenstermacher, G. D. (1990). Some moral considerations on teaching as a profession. In J. I. Goodlad, R. Soder, & K. A. Sirotnik (Eds.), *The moral dimensions of teaching* (pp. 130–151). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Fenstermacher, G. D. (2001). On the concept of manner and its visibility in teaching practice. *The Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 33(6), 639–653.
- Freeman, N. K. (1998). Morals and character: The foundations of ethics and professionalism. *The Educational Forum*, 63(1), 30–36.
- Goodlad, J. I., Soder, R., & Sirotnik, K. A. (Eds.). (1990). *The moral dimensions of teaching*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Goodman, J. F., & Lesnick, H. (2004). *Moral education: A teacher-centered approach*. Boston: Pearson Education.
- Goodson, I. (2003). *Professional knowledge, professional lives*. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press/McGraw-Hill.
- Grant, R. W. (1996). The ethics of talk: Classroom conversation and democratic politics. *Teachers College Record*, 97(Spring), 470–482.
- Halstead, J. M., & Taylor, M. J. (2000). Learning and teaching about values: A review of recent research. *Cambridge Journal of Education*, 30(2), 169–202.
- Hansen, D. T. (1993a). The moral importance of the teacher's style. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 25(5), 397–421.

- Hansen, D. T. (1993b). From role to person: The moral layeredness of classroom teaching. *American Educational Research Journal*, 30(4), 651–674.
- Hansen, D. T. (1998). The moral is in the practice. *Teaching and Teacher Education*, 14(6), 643–655.
- Hansen, D. T. (2001). *Exploring the moral heart of teaching: Towards a teacher's creed*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Haynes, F. (1998). *The Ethical School*. London: Routledge.
- Hostetler, K. D. (1997). *Ethical judgment in teaching*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Huebner, D. (1996). Teaching as a moral activity. *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision*, 11(3), 267–275.
- Jackson, P. W., Boostrom, R. E., & Hansen, D. T. (1993). *The moral life of schools*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Jones, E. N., Ryan, K., and Bohlin, K. (1998). Character education and teacher education: How are prospective teachers being prepared to foster good character in students? *Action in Teacher Education*, 20(4): 11–28.
- Joseph, P. B. (2003). Teaching about the moral classroom: infusing the moral imagination into teacher education. *Asia-Pacific Journal of Teacher Education*, 31(1), 7–20.
- Joseph, P. B., & Efron, S. (2005). Seven worlds of moral education. *Phi Delta Kappan*, March: 525–533.
- Katz, M. S., Noddings, N., & Strike, K. A. (1999). *Justice and caring: The search for common ground in education*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Kohn, A. (1996) What's wrong with character education? *ASCD Education Update*, 38(3), 5.
- Kohn, A. (1997). How not to teach values. *The Education Digest*, May: 12–17.
- Koschoreck, J. W. (2006). Teaching social justice in educational leadership: An interview with James W. Koschoreck, interviewed by Gerardo R. López, *UCEA Review*. Summer: 10–11.
- Leming, J. S., & Yendol-Hoppey, D. (2004). Experiencing character education: Student and teacher voices. *Journal of Research in Character Education*, 2(1): 1–17.
- Lickona, T. (1991). *Educating for character: How our schools can teach respect and responsibility*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Lickona, T. (2004). *Character matters: How to help our children develop good judgment, integrity, and other essential virtues*. New York: Touchstone.
- Lovat, T. J. (1998). Ethics and ethics education: Professional and curricular best practice. *Curriculum Perspectives*, 18(1), 1–7.
- Luckowski, J. A. (1997). A virtue-centered approach to ethics education. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 48(4), 264–270.
- MacMillan, C. J. B. (1993). Ethics and teacher professionalism. In K. A. Strike & P. L. Ternasky (Eds.), *Ethics for professionals in education: Perspectives for preparation and practice* (pp. 189–201). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Mathison, C. (1998). How teachers feel about character education: a descriptive study. *Action in Teacher Education*, 20(4): 29–38.
- McCadden, B. M. (1998). *It's hard to be good: Moral complexity, construction, and connection in a kindergarten classroom*. New York: Peter Lang.
- McClellan, E. (1999). *Moral education in America: Schools and the shaping of character from colonial times to the present*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- McLaren, P. (1994). *Life in schools: An introduction to critical pedagogy in the foundations of education* (2nd ed.). New York: Longman.
- McLaren, P. (1997). *Revolutionary multiculturalism: Pedagogy of dissent for the new millennium*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Murphy, M. M. (1998). *Character education in America's blue ribbon schools: Best practices for meeting the challenge*. Lancaster, PA: Technomic.
- Nash, R. J. (1996). *"Real world" ethics: Frameworks for educators and human service professionals*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Nash, R. J. (1997). *Answering the "VirtueCrats": A moral conversation on character education*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Nash, R. J. (2005). Foreword. In B. Zubay & J. F. Soltis, *Creating the ethical school: A book of case studies*. New York: Teachers College Press.

- Noddings, N. (2002). *Educating moral people: A caring alternative to character education*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Nord, W. A. (2001). Moral disagreement, moral education, common ground. In D. Ravitch & J. P. Viteritti (Eds.), *Making good citizens: Education and civil society* (pp. 142–167). New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Nucci, L. P. (2001). *Education in the moral domain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Obidah, J. E., Jackson-Minot, M., Monroe, C. R., & Williams, B. (2004). Crime and punishment: Moral dilemmas in the inner-city classroom. In V. S. Walker & J. R. Snarey (Eds.), *Race-ing moral formation: African American perspectives on care and justice* (pp. 111–129). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Oser, F., & Althof, W. (1993). Trust in advance: On the professional morality of teachers. *Journal of Moral Education*, 22(3): 253–275.
- Osguthorpe, R. D. (2006). On the possible forms a relationship might take between the moral character of a teacher and the moral development of a student. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, April.
- Purpel, D. E. (1999). *Moral outrage in education*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Ravitch, D., & Viteritti, J. P. (2001). *Making good citizens: Education and civil society*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Reitz, D. J. (1998). *Moral crisis in the schools: What parents and teachers need to know*. Baltimore, MD: Cathedral Foundation Press.
- Rest, J. R., & Narváez, D. (Eds.) (1994). *Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Richardson, V., & Fallona, C. (2001). Classroom management as method and manner. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 33(6): 705–728.
- Richardson, V., & Fenstermacher, G. D. (2001). Manner in teaching: the study in four parts, *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 33(6), 631–637.
- Ryan, K. (1993). Why a center for the advancement of ethics and character? *Journal of Education*, 175(2): 1–11.
- Ryan, K., & Bohlin, K. E. (1999). *Building character in schools: Practical ways to bring moral instruction to life*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Sanger, M. G. (2001). Talking to teachers and looking at practice in understanding the moral dimensions of teaching, *The Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 33(6), 683–704.
- Schwartz, G. E. (1998). Teaching as vocation: Enabling ethical practice, *The Educational Forum*, 63(1), 23–29.
- Sergiovanni, T. J. (1992). *Moral leadership: Getting to the heart of school improvement*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Shapiro, J. P., and Stefkovich, J. A. (2005). *Ethical leadership and decision-making in education: Applying theoretical perspectives to complex dilemmas* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Simon, K. G. (2001). *Moral questions in the classroom*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Sirotnik, K. A. (1990). Society, schooling, teaching, and preparing to teach. In J. I. Goodlad, R. Soder, & K. A. Sirotnik (Eds.), *The moral dimensions of teaching* (pp. 296–327). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Sizer, T. R., & Sizer, N. F. (1999). *The students are watching: Schools and the moral contract*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Slattery, P., & Rapp, D. (2003). *Ethics and the foundations of education: Teaching convictions in a postmodern world*. Boston: Pearson Education.
- Smagorinsky, P., & Taxel, J. (2005). *The discourse of character education: Culture wars in the classroom*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Sockett, H. (1993). *The moral base for teacher professionalism*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Sockett, H. (1996). Can virtue be taught? *The Educational Forum*, 60(Winter), 124–129.
- Sockett, H., & LePage, P. (2002). The missing language of the classroom. *Teachers and Teacher Education*, 18, 159–171.
- Soder, R. (1990). The rhetoric of teacher professionalism. In J. I. Goodlad, R. Soder, & K. A. Sirotnik (Eds.), *The moral dimensions of teaching* (pp. 35–86). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

- Soltis, J. F. (1986). Teaching professional ethics. *Journal of Teacher Education*, 37(3), 2–4.
- Sommers, C. H. (1984). Ethics without virtue: moral education in America. *The American Scholar*, 53(3), 381–389.
- Starratt, R. J. (1994). *Building an ethical school: A practical response to the moral crisis in schools*. London: The Falmer Press.
- Stengel, B., & Tom, A. (1995). Taking the moral nature of teaching seriously. *The Educational Forum*, 59(2), 154–163.
- Strike, K.A. (1990) The legal and moral responsibility of teachers. In J. I. Goodlad, R. Soder, & K. A. Sirotnik (Eds.), *The moral dimensions of teaching* (pp. 188–223). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Strike, K. A. (1995). Professional ethics and the education of professionals. *Educational Horizons*, 74(1), 29–36.
- Strike, K. A. (1999). Justice, caring, and universality: In defence of moral pluralism. In M. S. Katz, N. Noddings, & K. A. Strike (Eds.), *Justice and caring: The search for common ground in education* (pp. 21–36). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Strike, K. A., & Soltis, J. F. (1992). *The ethics of teaching* (2nd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Strike, K. A., & Ternasky, P. L. (Eds.). (1993). *Ethics for professionals in education: Perspectives for preparation and practice*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Strom, S. M. (1989). The ethical dimension of teaching. In M.C. Reynolds (Ed.), *Knowledge base for the beginning teacher* (pp. 267–276). Oxford: Pergamon Press.
- Thompson, M. (1997). *Professional ethics and the teacher: Towards a general teaching council*. Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books.
- Tirri, K., & Husu, J. (2002). Care and responsibility in “the best interest of the child”: Relational voices of ethical dilemmas in teaching. *Teachers and Teaching: Theory and Practice*, 8(1), 65–80.
- Tom, A. R. (1984). *Teaching as a moral craft*. New York: Longman.
- Valli, L. (1990). Moral approaches to reflective practice, in R. T. Clift, W. R. Houston, & M. C. Pugach (Eds.), *Encouraging reflective practice in education* (pp. 39–56). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Walker, V. S., & Snarey, J. R. (Eds.). (2004). *Race-ing moral formation: African American perspectives on care and justice*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Watras, J. (1986). Will teaching applied ethics improve schools of education? *Journal of Teacher Education*, 37(3), 13–16.
- Watson, M. (2003). *Learning to trust*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Weissbourd, R. (2003). Moral teachers, moral students. *Educational Leadership*, 60(6), 6–11.
- Wiley, L. S. (1998). *Comprehensive character-building classroom: A handbook for teachers*. DeBary, FL: Longwood Communications.
- Wynne, E. A., & Ryan, K. (1997). *Reclaiming our schools: Teaching character, academics, and discipline* (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

